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INTRODUCTION 
In June 2013 the disclosure of the now-infamous Verizon 
order—leaked by Edward Snowden and published by the 
Guardian—shocked the public.  The order required disclosure 
to the NSA all records of domestic and international calls on 
Verizon Business Network Services—an order which swept in 
the call records of millions of Americans. 1   The order, 
 
 *  Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier Foundation. 
 1. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order 
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things, BR 13-80 FISC (July 19, 2013); 
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon 
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), 
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splashed across the pages of a British newspaper complete 
with its TOP SECRET markings, caused a tremendous public 
outcry.  Rightfully, the public was taken aback by the order’s 
sweeping breadth, the NSA’s gathering of information on 
Americans, and, for many, the revelation that America had a 
secret surveillance court. 
However, to those watching surveillance issues closely, 
the existence of the program was no secret.  Indeed, details of 
the program were first published in USA Today, seven years 
before the Guardian’s story.2  While the program’s existence 
was not entirely secret, its legal basis was.  And, with no 
public law that explicitly authorized such conduct, civil 
liberties advocates were left wondering: How could this be 
legal? 3  Nevertheless, aside from grumblings from a few 
members of Congress, the government had been able to stay 
remarkably silent about the ways it had interpreted Section 
215, the provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
it relied on to obtain call records in bulk.4   
The public debate that followed the Guardian’s disclosure 
did not prove to be a ringing endorsement of that secret legal 
interpretation or the democratic processes that gave rise to it.  
Less than a year after the program’s full public disclosure, 
the call records collection program appears to be on its last 
legs, both legally and politically.  At least one court has 
declared it unconstitutional; 5  two separate, independent 
executive branch oversight bodies have recommended its 
end;6 President Obama has signaled he intends to end the 
program;7 and, after reviewing the program for only a few 
 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-
court-order. 
 2. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, 
USA TODAY (May 11, 2006), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm. 
 3. The short answer: it’s not. 
 4. See infra at 5–11. 
 5. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 6. PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE & COMMC’NS TECHS., 
LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (2013); DAVID MEDINE ET AL., 
PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014). 
 7. Anita Kumar, Obama Signals Changes Likely to NSA Spying, 
MCCLATCHY WASHINGTON BUREAU (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/welcome_page/?shf=/2013/12/20/212377_obama-
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months, government officials were able to conceive of ways of 
achieving the call records collection program’s objectives in a 
manner more sensitive to civil liberties.8  For a program that, 
as the government touted, “all three branches of government” 
participated in, one would expect it could survive more than a 
year’s worth of public scrutiny.9 
The story of Section 215 serves as a cautionary tale for 
excluding the public from the debate on surveillance 
techniques and the interpretation of federal surveillance 
laws.  But the problem of secret reinterpretation of 
surveillance laws is not one unique to Section 215.  It is a 
problem that constantly recurs: as new surveillance 
technologies or programs emerge, government officials 
inevitably seek to press those techniques into service within 
already existing legal authorities. Because law enforcement 
officials are hesitant to disclose these techniques, and the 
legal analysis supporting them, for fear of disclosing 
surveillance “sources and methods,” the public is left in the 
dark—both about the use of new techniques and the legal 
authority that supports it.10 
This article proposes a modest solution for the problem of 
secret interpretations of surveillance law.  The Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), with only a measured extension of 
current law and practice, is well-equipped to guard against 
precisely this problem.  Using a stalwart of FOIA litigation, 
the Vaughn index, this Article argues that courts should and, 
indeed, are already empowered to compel the government to 
provide summaries of the legal rationale underlying 
otherwise-sensitive surveillance programs.  This type of 
modified Vaughn index—a “tearline Vaughn”—could help 
bridge the current gap between the government’s need to 
protect “sources and methods” and the democratic need for 
public accountability and legitimacy. 
 
signals-changes-likely-to.html. 
 8. Statement of Administration Policy, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (Nov. 
17, 2014), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/113/saps2685s
20141117.pdf. 
 9. See Cheryl Pellerin, Officials Discuss Intelligence Programs at Senate 
Hearing, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Sept. 27, 2013), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120873. 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
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I. THE SECRET STORY OF SECTION 215 
In a 2011 speech on the Senate floor, Senator Ron Wyden 
ominously declared: 
I have served on the Intelligence Committee for over a 
decade and I wish to deliver a warning this 
afternoon.  When the American people find out how their 
government has secretly interpreted the PATRIOT Act, 
they are going to be stunned and they are going to be 
angry. . . . The fact is anyone can read the plain text of the 
PATRIOT Act.  Yet many Members of Congress have no 
idea how the law is being secretly interpreted by the 
executive branch[.]11 
That day came on June 5, 2013, when, as described 
above, the Guardian published an order issued by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court.12  But the story of Section 
215 and the NSA’s bulk collection of Americans’ call records 
began over a decade before. 
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the NSA began 
collecting Americans’ call records in bulk from two major 
telecommunication companies. 13   In the beginning of the 
program, there were no court orders; instead, the companies 
were provided with presidential “authorizations” that stated 
the Attorney General had determined the program to be 
legal.14 
For nearly five years, the call records program continued 
in secret—alongside other NSA domestic surveillance 
programs— “justified” on the basis of the President’s inherent 
executive authority alone. 15   In December 2005, NSA’s 
domestic surveillance programs made their first public 
appearances.  First, the New York Times reported that 
President Bush had authorized the NSA to spy within the 
 
 11. 157 CONG. REC. S3,386 (daily ed. May 26, 2011). 
 12. Greenwald, supra note 1. 
 13. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, ST-09-0002 WORKING DRAFT 33–
34 (2009), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/27/nsa-inspector-
general-report-document-data-collection [hereinafter OIG WORKING DRAFT 
REPORT].  A third company began providing call detail records in December 
2002. 
 14. OFFICES OF INSPECTORS GENERAL, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE 
PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (2009), available at 
www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf; OIG WORKING DRAFT REPORT, supra note 13. 
 15. Id. at 39–40. 
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United States without warrants.16  Then in May 2006, USA 
Today disclosed the call records program.17  While President 
Bush and other government officials confirmed portions of the 
Times’ account, the government managed to avoid confirming 
the accuracy of USA Today’s story.18 
While the disclosures did not change the government’s 
legal approach, the firms participating in the program 
developed cold feet. Shortly after the New York Times 
disclosures, lawsuits were filed across the country against 
telecommunication companies, like AT&T and Verizon, 
alleging violations of federal wiretapping and privacy laws by 
assisting the government.19  In light of these suits, and to put 
the disclosure of call records to the NSA on ostensibly firmer 
legal footing, the telcos requested that the call records 
program be shifted to a court-ordered regime.20  By May 24, 
2006—less than a month after the program’s disclosure in 
USA Today—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) issued its first Section 215 order for the bulk collection 
of Americans’ call records.21 
The provision of law the government relied on, 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1861, is commonly known as Section 215—taking its name 
from the provision of the USA PATRIOT Act of which it was a 
part.  The Patriot Act amended the “business records” 
provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  
Section 215 broadened what had previously been a narrow 
authority to obtain records of “common carriers,” such as 
hotel records, car rental records, and storage unit rentals.22  
It authorized the FBI, upon an application to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, to compel the production of 
“any tangible thing[]” from a third-party that was “relevant” 
to an authorized foreign intelligence investigation.23  It is this 
statutory language that was stretched to give the NSA, not 
 
 16. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without 
Courts, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html. 
 17. Cauley, supra note 2. 
 18. See id. 
 19. NSA Multi-District Litigation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/cases/nsa-multi-district-litigation. 
 20. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, supra note 14. 
 21. See id. 
 22. 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (2006). 
 23. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
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the FBI, the authority to obtain past and future call record 
information on millions of Americans with no connection to 
terrorism or any other “authorized foreign intelligence 
investigation.”24 
Of course, the FISC’s orders remained secret, and the 
program continued largely unchanged and uninterrupted.  
Although Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys publicly 
disclosed that Section 215 orders were being used to support 
a “sensitive collection program” in 2009,25 from 2006 to 2013, 
Section 215 was discussed only fleetingly in public, primarily 
in the context of Section 215’s various reauthorizations.  
In 2009, Senator Richard Durbin, a member of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that “the government’s 
use of Section 215 is unfortunately cloaked in secrecy.  Some 
day that cloak will be lifted, and future generations will ask 
whether our actions today meet the test of a democratic 
society: transparency, accountability, and fidelity to the rule 
of law and our Constitution.”26  Similarly, then-Senator Russ 
Feingold, a member of both the Senate Judiciary Committee 
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”), 
stated: “There is information about the use of Section 215 
orders that I believe Congress and the American people 
deserve to know . . . at least basic information about how they 
have been used.”27 
In May 2011, two Senators on the SSCI again voiced 
public concerns about the government’s use of Section 215 
orders.  Senator Mark Udall echoed concerns, similar to his 
colleagues earlier concerns, about the scope of Section 215: 
“Congress is granting powers to the [E]xecutive [B]ranch that 
lead to abuse, and frankly, shield the [E]xecutive [B]ranch 
from accountability.”28  Two days later, Senator Udall argued 
that the executive’s “official interpretation of” the nation’s 
 
 24. Id. § 1861. 
 25. Hearing on the USA Patriot Act Before the Subcomm. on Constitution, 
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 Cong. 8 
(2009) (testimony of Todd Hinnen). 
 26. Executive Business Meeting Before the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, 111 Cong. (2009) (Remarks of Sen. Richard Durbin) (Remarks begin 
at 68:00), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/executive-
business-meeting-2009-10-01. 
 27. 155 CONG. REC. S9,563 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Feingold). 
 28. 157 CONG. REC. S3258 (daily ed. May 24, 2011). 
2015] SECRET SURVEILLANCE LAW 167 
laws should not “be kept secret.”29  To that end, when Section 
215 was scheduled to expire in 2011, Senators Wyden and 
Udall co-sponsored an amendment to its reauthorization, 
requiring government officials to “not secretly reinterpret 
public laws and statutes” and to “not describe the execution of 
these laws in a way that misinforms or misleads the public.”30 
In a September 2011 letter, Senators Wyden and Udall 
again criticized DOJ officials for making “misleading 
statements pertaining to the government’s interpretation of 
surveillance laws.”31  The letter criticized DOJ’s claims that 
Section 215 was being used in ways analogous to grand jury 
subpoenas, claims the Senators “consider[ed] highly 
misleading” and that “provide[d] the public with a false 
understanding of how surveillance law is interpreted in 
practice.” 32   The letter also criticized DOJ’s claims that 
Section 215 was not a “secret law;” as the letter noted, “when 
the government relies on significant interpretations of public 
statutes that are kept secret from the American public, the 
government is effectively relying on secret law.”33 
Finally, in March 2012, Senators Wyden and Udall wrote 
in a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder noting that it “is a 
matter of public record that Section 215, which is a public 
statute, has been the subject of secret legal 
interpretations . . . [contained in] opinions issued by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.”34  The letter noted 
that the American public has a “need and a right to know how 
[Section 215] is being interpreted, so that they can ratify or 
reject decisions made on their behalf.”35  The letter continued 
that “American laws . . . should not be made public only when 
government officials find it convenient. They should be public 
all the time, and every American should be able to find out 
 
 29. See 157 CONG. REC. S3,388–89 (daily ed. May 26, 2011) (statement of 
Sen. Udall). 
 30. See 157 CONG. REC. S3,360 (daily ed. May 25, 2011) (SA 384 to S. 1038, 
112th Cong. § 3 (2011)). 
 31. Letter from Sen. Ron Wyden and Sen. Mark Udall, to Attorney General 
Eric Holder 1 (Sept. 21, 2011). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1–2. 
 34. Letter from Sen. Ron Wyden and Sen. Mark Udall, to Attorney General 
Eric Holder 1 (Mar. 15, 2012). 
 35. Id. at 1–2. 
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what their government thinks those laws mean.”36 
In October 2011, on the tenth anniversary of the Patriot 
Act, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed separate 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuits against the 
DOJ. 37  The lawsuits sought to uncover the “secret legal 
interpretation” of Section 215 about which elected officials 
had warned.38  For nearly three years, the lawsuits yielded 
only limited information. 
Early in the case, the ACLU sought partial summary 
judgment motion on the withholding of a single document.39  
The ACLU contended the document contained Section 215’s 
secret legal interpretation; the government, for its part, 
claimed that the document only described classified 
surveillance techniques and did not, in fact, contain any legal 
interpretation.40  After reviewing the document in camera, a 
judge in the Southern District of New York agreed, and 
granted partial summary judgment for the government. 41  
While the case continued for the balance of the responsive 
documents, the suit largely languished. 
EFF’s suit fared little better.  EFF identified a series of 
FISC opinions withheld by the government that, EFF argued, 
contained the secret interpretation of Section 215. 42  The 
government, for its part, claimed everything within the 
opinions was classified: the dates the opinions were issued, 
the topics of the opinions, even the number of pages that were 
 
 36. Id. at 2. 
 37. EFF Sues for Answers About Patriot Act on Law’s 10th Anniversary, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Oct. 26, 2011), 
https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-sues-answers-about-patriot-act-laws-10th-
anniversary; Anna Estevao, ACLU Sues Government to Find Out Secret 
Interpretation of Patriot Act, ACLU (Oct. 26, 2011), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/aclu-sues-government-find-out-
secret-interpretation-patriot-act. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Mem. & Order, ACLU v. FBI, No. 11-cv-7562-WHP (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/section215/DistrictCourtProceedings/sec215_order_gr
anting_goverment_motion_for_summary_judgment_may_17_2012.pdf. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Notice of Mot. for Pl., Electronic Frontier Foundation v. United States 
Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2013), available at 
https://www.eff.org/document/effs-opposition-and-cross-motion-summary-
judgment. 
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in the opinions.43  Although a court in the Northern District of 
California ordered the government to disclose some 
information about the opinions, three years after filing suit, 
the government’s secret interpretation remained safely under 
wraps.44 
The Guardian’s June 2013 article disclosed what the 
courts had refused to do—the program and its legal 
underpinnings.  As a result of the disclosure of the call 
records program in the Guardian, and the government’s 
confirmation of the program, there was no longer a sound 
basis for refusing to disclose the secret legal interpretations 
that the government relied on to support those programs.  
Consequently, EFF and ACLU’s lawsuits resulted in the 
release of hundreds of pages of previously secret FISC 
opinions on Section 215.45 
The proposals in this article, if implemented, can help 
prevent a similar scenario from occurring in the future. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF SECRET (SURVEILLANCE) LAW 
AND THE TRADITIONAL WAYS TO AVOID IT 
A. The Problem of Secret (Surveillance) Law 
Broadly speaking, secret law obstructs democratic 
accountability and legitimacy. 46   By obstructing citizen 
oversight of the manner in which government officials 
interpret and implement the law, it is impossible to 
knowledgeably (1) reform the laws; (2) ratify interpretations 
 
 43. Mem. of P. & A. for Def., Electronic Frontier Foundation v. United 
States Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR (N.D. Cal. 2013), available at 
https://www.eff.org/document/department-justices-opposition-and-reply. 
 44. Order Re: Further Submission on Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation v. Department of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-
YGR, (N.D. Cal. 2013), available at https://www.eff.org/document/courts-order-
requiring-further-submissions-defendants. 
 45. See, e.g., Trevor Timm, Hundreds of Pages of NSA Spying Documents to 
be Released as Result of EFF Lawsuit, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 
(Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-
spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit. 
 46. There is little need to dwell on the problems presented by secret law. As 
one commentator has noted, “condemnation of secret law seems too easy, 
because it is morally and politically over determined, after two centuries worth 
of the rhetoric and developing practice of liberalism and democratic self-
government.” Christopher Kutz, The Repugnance of Secret Law, UC BERKELEY 
SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law.usc.edu/centers/clp/papers/documents/Kutz.pdf. 
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of current law; or (3) hold political officials to account 
(whether through support or condemnation)47  Without the 
pressure of accountability, democratic legitimacy, in turn, 
falls away. 
The problem of secret law in the surveillance context 
deserves additional attention because the problems posed by 
secret law are exaggerated in the surveillance context.  In 
general, the interpretation of laws by government officials 
cause government action that, in turn, has recognizable 
physical effects—interpretation of tax laws results in tax 
liens; traffic laws, traffic tickets; and so on.  Indeed, even 
otherwise “secret” government action typically produces some 
physical manifestation of that action: for example, try as the 
government might to keep its drone strikes in the Middle 
East a secret, as public evidence and real world effects 
accumulated, government secrecy concerning those 
operations (and, relatedly, their legal justification) became 
increasingly difficult to shield from public scrutiny.48 
Surveillance is different.  As the Supreme Court 
recognized in United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith case), 
electronic surveillance—with its “broad and unsuspected 
governmental incursions into conversational privacy”—
requires heightened attention.49  Surveillance, unlike most 
forms of government action, is by its very nature clandestine.  
It can be difficult, if not impossible, to detect, and thus its 
public disclosure through observation is less likely.50 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Cora Courrier, How the Gov’t Talks About A Drone Program It Won’t 
Acknowledge Exists, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 13, 2012), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/how-the-govt-talks-about-a-drone-program-it-
wont-acknowledge.  The CIA’s drone program exemplifies the absurdity of the 
government’s continued insistence on secrecy: secrecy is difficult when, for 
example, a Twitter feed (https://twitter.com/dronestream) publicly catalogues 
each reported government strike. 
 49. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
 50. This is not to say that surveillance has no effect, particularly on those 
being surveilled.  See generally Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).  Obviously, and as the Supreme Court 
recognized in Keith, government incursions into conversational privacy are, 
themselves, one effect which must be guarded against. It is also not to say that 
it is impossible to detect electronic surveillance, depending on the method of 
surveillance employed.  Finally, this is not to say surveillance is the only type of 
covert government action.  Obviously, a great deal of government activity, 
particularly in the national security context, occurs covertly.  However, I see no 
reason that the principles which this article advances—access to the legal 
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As new surveillance techniques or activities come to 
fruition, law enforcement officials are quick to fit them within 
existing legal authorities and frameworks with varying 
degrees of credibility.  In the “competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime,” 51  secrecy—both for surveillance 
techniques and their legal bases—is suggested to be a 
necessary evil: secrecy is necessary, it is argued, so that 
criminals cannot thwart legitimate government surveillance.  
As a corollary, secrecy for the technique is used to justify 
secrecy for the legal analysis.  If the legal basis for an 
otherwise secret surveillance technique is disclosed, 
government officials argue, that would inevitably result in 
disclosure of the technique itself.52 
This theory has justified the concealment of a great 
number of surveillance activities and a great many legal 
interpretations.  Recent examples include: the suppression of 
information concerning law enforcement’s use of Stingray 
devices;53 secrecy in Office of Legal Counsel’s memoranda 
concerning authoritative interpretations of federal 
surveillance law; 54  and, perhaps most saliently, the legal 
opinions of the FISC.55  Each of these varieties of secret 
surveillance law has been perpetuated on the basis that 
disclosure of the legal rationale would, itself, reveal the 
technique. 
 
principles animating surveillance—could not apply to other covert activities. 
 51. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 52. See e.g., Final Brief for Appellee at 42–47, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 12-5363 (11th Cir. June 7, 2013), 
available at https://www.eff.org/document/dojs-appellate-brief; Motion at 14, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 05221 (N.D. Cal. 
2014), available at https://www.eff.org/document/doj-motion-summary-
judgment-1. 
 53. Feds intervening to suppress disclosure of stingray records in FL; or 
recent muckrock article re: FBI rider in all stingray contracts that info must 
remain secret; Shawn Musgrave, Before They Could Track Cell Phone Data, 
Police Had to Sign a NDA with the FBI, MUCKROCK (Sept. 22, 2014), 
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2014/sep/22/they-could-track-cell-
phone-data-police-had-sign-n/. 
 54. The Editorial Board, What Happened to Transparency?, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/opinion/what-
happened-to-transparency.html. 
 55. Charlie Savage & Laura Poitras, How a Court Secretly Evolved, 
Extending U.S. Spies’ Reach, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2014), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/us/how-a-courts-secret-evolution-extended-
spies-reach.html. 
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A. Traditional Ways of Avoiding Secret Law and Their 
Shortcomings: Congressional Investigation, Discovery, 
Leaks, and FOIA 
The government does not always rely upon secret legal 
interpretations of federal law and the Constitution.  At least 
three mechanisms currently exist to counteract secret 
interpretations of federal law: Congressional investigation, 
discovery, leaks, and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  
Through disclosures based on these three mechanisms, legal 
interpretations can then be tested in adversarial proceedings 
or reviewed and scrutinized in the court of public opinion.  
Either of these types of disclosure, in court or to the public, 
serves the ultimate goal of ensuring public ratification and 
legitimizing interpretations of law on which the government 
operates.  But, as will be discussed, each of these mechanisms 
has its own disadvantages as well. 
1. Congressional Investigation 
Of all the methods of disclosing secret interpretations of 
law, Congressional investigation may be the most potent. 
Congress, obviously, is a coequal branch of government, 
empowered to investigate the actions of the executive 
branch.56  This authority, in the past, has been powerfully 
exercised to uncover intelligence agency actions and their 
purported legal bases.  
 The Church and Pike Committees are the highest 
examples of the robust power of Congressional investigation 
to provide the public with information about the actions of 
intelligence agencies. Following a series of reports concerning 
illegal actions by intelligence agencies,57 Congress convened 
the two committees to investigate the actions of the CIA, 
NSA, and FBI.58  The hearings and reports of the committees 
resulted in the most expansive, and public, look at the actions 
 
 56.  McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174–175 (1927) 
 57.  See, e.g., Seymour Hersh, Huge C.I.A. operation reported in U.S. against 
antiwar forces, other dissidents in Nixon years, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 22, 
1974). 
 58.  Gerald K. Haines, The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA, 
Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998-99), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/csi-studies/studies/winter98_99. 
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of American intelligence agencies in our nation’s history.59  
The recommendations of the committees led to numerous 
reforms, including the creation of standing Congressional 
committees overseeing intelligence agency conduct and the 
passage of new laws, like the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, to rein in intelligence agency conduct.60 
The standing committees, in turn, have continued their 
oversight of intelligence agency conduct. At times, this 
oversight has lead to thorough and public reviews of 
intelligence agency conduct.61 More often, however, committee 
oversight has meant closed door briefings and, at best, public 
hints at the edges62 But, even with continued oversight of 
intelligence committees, it is clear that the mechanisms for 
preventing the development of secret law have failed. Section 
215, a perfect example of secret agency reinterpretation, 
occurred under the careful watch of both Congressional 
intelligence committees. 63  The probable reasons for this 
breakdown—distorted classification policy, committee 
capture, institutional deficiencies, or other reasons 64—are 
beyond the scope of this Article. But, suffice it to say, 
Congressional oversight, although a potentially potent tool, 
failed spectacularly and publicly in preventing the 
development of secret surveillance law. 
2. Discovery 
The first, and perhaps most common, method for 
compelled disclosure of the government’s legal interpretations 
supporting law enforcement techniques is through disclosure 
 
 59.  See Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect 
to Intelligence Agencies, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976) (7 volume report on actions 
of intelligence agencies). 
 60.  See 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCo
mmittee.htm. 
 61.  See, e.g., Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of 
the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (Dec. 
13, 2014) 
 62.  See supra at 105–06. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Amy P. Zegart, The Roots of Weak Congressional Intelligence 
Oversight, TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW, available at 
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Zegart.
pdf; DENNIS MCDONOUGH ET AL., NO MERE OVERSIGHT, CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IS BROKEN (2006). 
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during discovery in criminal and, to a lesser extent, civil 
cases.  In the criminal context, the government is required to 
disclose the methods employed to obtain the evidence it will 
rely on at trial. 65   If the government relied on a novel 
surveillance technique or novel legal authority, a criminal 
defendant (with competent counsel) will challenge the legality 
of that technique in an attempt to suppress the evidence.  
And, in the course of briefing the suppression issue, the 
government’s legal theories will necessarily be disclosed—and 
tested—in adversarial proceedings.66  Civil cases, too, can 
allow for public disclosure of the government’s legal 
interpretation supporting a particular technique.67 
Examples are plentiful: in United States v. Ringmaiden, 
a criminal defendant challenged the government’s use of a 
“Stingray”—a device that “catches” the International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) of cell phones in an area for the 
purpose of tracking an individual’s movements.68  In United 
States v. Forrester, a defendant challenged the use of an 
internet pen-register device.69  Perhaps more prominently, in 
Kyllo v. United States, a criminal defendant challenged the 
warrantless use of thermal imaging technology that led to a 
conviction for marijuana cultivation.70  And in United States 
v. Jones, the defendant challenged the government’s use of 
GPS tracking to secure a conviction for drug conspiracy and 
distribution.71 
But limiting disclosure of legal theories to those 
occurring in criminal cases leaves gaps in public 
understanding.  This is so because prosecutors only disclose 
that a new technique has been used when the government 
 
 65. See, e.g., Brady v. State of Maryland, 273 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. 
United States, 405 U.S. 31 (1972). 
 66. Kevin Poulsen, Documents: FBI Spyware Has Been Snaring 
Extortionists, Hackers for Years, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2009), 
http://www.wired.com/2009/04/fbi-spyware-pro/. 
 67. Although absent indisputable proof the surveillance has occurred—the 
government has used questions of standing to avoid addressing the substantive 
legality of surveillance. See Amnesty v. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 68. Hanni Fakhoury, Stingrays: The Biggest Technological Threat to Cell 
Phone Privacy You Don’t Know About, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 
(Oct. 22, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/10/stingrays-biggest-
unknown-technological-threat-cell-phone-privacy. 
 69. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 70. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 71. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
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intends to introduce that evidence or rely on evidence derived 
from the technique.  And, as recent disclosures confirm, law 
enforcement often takes great pains to avoid disclosing that a 
particular technique has been used or has generated evidence 
derived from the technique. 72   This type of investigatory 
“laundering,” in turn, precludes a public understanding, and 
adversarial testing, of the legal basis for the technique (even 
if the technique’s legality has been reviewed internally within 
the executive branch). 
Recent disclosures concerning the Drug Enforcement 
Agency’s (DEA) use of NSA-derived information illustrates 
the problem.  To avoid informing criminal defendants that 
information used in their arrest had been derived from NSA 
surveillance, DEA engaged in “parallel construction”: that is, 
the collection of evidence, through independent and 
alternative means of investigation, originally obtained 
through NSA’s surveillance programs.73  The government has 
taken a similarly recalcitrant approach to its disclosure 
obligations under the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), a 2008 
law that authorized broad, warrantless surveillance of 
international communications. 74   Not a single criminal 
defendant was notified that FAA surveillance had been used 
from the laws passage, in 2008, until September 2013. 75  
Consequently, the government effectively obstructed review 
of the constitutionality of the law and the surveillance 
conducted under its authority.  Aside from the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment problems stemming from the government’s 
secretive approach, the public suffers—it is blocked from 
understanding the legal authorities that animate government 
conduct. 
A similar problem arises in the conduct of intelligence 
programs or techniques, especially those occurring abroad, 
that never give rise to criminal prosecution.  Although not 
 
 72. See, e.g., John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. Directs 
Agents to Cover Up Program Used to Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 
2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sod-
idUSBRE97409R20130805. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 50 U.S.C § 1881(a). 
 75. Charlie Savage, Federal Prosecutors, In A Policy Shift, Cite Warrantless 
Wiretapes As Evidence, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 26, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/us/federal-prosecutors-in-a-policy-shift-cite-
warrantless-wiretaps-as-evidence.html. 
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involving surveillance law, the government’s legal rationale 
for the targeted killing of Americans’ abroad amply 
demonstrates the dilemma.  Given that the government was 
contemplating an extrajudicial killing of an American citizen, 
the chance that the legal justification for conducting that 
killing would arise in a criminal trial was, obviously, 
minimal. In the surveillance context, the government 
undertakes a great many surveillance techniques and 
procedures abroad, the vast majority of which will never lead 
to a criminal prosecution.  Consequently, under current 
practices, the accompanying legal analysis may never see 
public disclosure. 
3. Leaks 
In general, there are two kinds of leaks76—authorized 
leaks and unauthorized leaks.  For different reasons, neither 
is an ideal vehicle for eliminating secret law. 
First, authorized leaks, done by government officials with 
the approval of the relevant policymakers, have a variety of 
purposes, from floating a proposed policy 77  to disclosing 
otherwise sensitive information that aids a particular policy 
or initiative.78  The difficulty with relying on the authorized 
leak is that it depends wholly on the decision-making of 
policymakers.  It thus entrusts the disclosure of the law to the 
same policymakers that chose to develop it in secret in the 
first instance.  Therefore, the authorized leak is not a 
promising solution to combating secret law. 
The unauthorized leak also does not offer a complete 
solution, but for different reasons.  At the outset, there are 
 
 76. For a far more comprehensive treatment on the subject of leaks and 
their various types, see David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the 
Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 512 (2013).  Pozen describes and catalogues a far greater number 
of types of leaks than “authorized” and “unauthorized,” however all identified 
types still seem to fall within one category or the other.  See id. at 532. 
 77. This type of leak is often known as a trial-balloon leak.  See id. at 532. 
 78. One example of this type of leak is the thwarting of a terrorist attack or 
the killing of a high-ranking terrorist leader.  Often the operations, and the 
facts themselves, are classified, yet the success of these missions is often 
intentionally revealed to the press.  See, e.g., Greg Young & Karen DeYoung, Al 
Queda airline bomb plot disrupted, U.S. says, THE WASHINGTON POST (May 7, 
2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-
disrupts-airline-bomb-plot/2012/05/07/gIQA9qE08T_story.html. 
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obviously problems with depending on unauthorized leaks for 
the disclosure of secret law.  Most obviously, it requires a 
person with knowledge or access to the law to leak 
documents; in the absence of a leaker, the public is beholden 
to the government’s disclosure decisions.  But, even when a 
leaker exists, unauthorized leaks carry risk.  Although the 
unauthorized leak has the capacity to disclose secret law, an 
authorized leak’s various permutations—from document 
dumps to leaks of single documents—often removes 
knowledgeable policymakers from the process of determining 
what will, and what will not, cause harm through disclosure.  
Consequently, the unauthorized leak risks overdisclosure of 
sensitive information.  This is not to say that government 
officials do not, with regularity, speak in greatly hyperbolic 
terms about the damage that unauthorized leaks do to 
national security. 79   They do.  But, even if regularly 
overstated, the concern is a legitimate one.  It is quite easy to 
envision circumstances in which disclosure of government 
secrets could cause irreparable harm.  This is so, even when 
the document disclosed consists solely of legal analysis.  
Invariably, that legal analysis would include discussion of 
specific facts or information that could reveal legitimately 
classified or sensitive information.  Removing the government 
and relevant policymakers from the disclosure process 
entirely would thus threaten disclosure of sensitive 
information. 
Of course, as a practical matter, established media 
outlets often work with the government before publishing 
leaked documents in order to withhold information the 
government claims cannot be disclosed.80  In this respect, 
unauthorized leaks are an improvement over authorized 
leaks, in that a third-party (the media) examines the 
government’s claims of harm to national security and makes 
decisions based on its own judgment.  Nevertheless, that 
 
 79. See, e.g., Jack Shafer, Live and Let Leak, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2014), 
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140754/jack-shafer/live-and-
let-leak (describing “irreparable harm” that would flow from the publication of 
plans for a hydrogen bomb and the Pentagon Papers, neither of which came to 
fruition). 
 80. See, e.g., A Note to Readers: The Decision to Publish Diplomatic 
Documents, NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 28, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29editornote.html. 
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process is an imperfect one, too.  First, media outlets can be 
swayed by hyperbolic government claims.  For example, the 
New York Times delayed its publication of a story on 
warrantless wiretapping for nearly two years, apparently in 
response to government claims of harm to national security.81  
Second, although the judgment of publishers is interposed 
between the government and disclosure, it is not clear that 
publisher’s judgment is the ideal one.  Aside from possible 
subject-matter knowledge and (purported) journalistic 
neutrality, on its face, there is little more that redeems the 
judgment of a newspaper publisher over that of 
democratically accountable policymaker.  Again, this is not to 
impugn journalists and the media.  Professional journalists 
often exercise remarkable judgment about what should and 
should not be disclosed—often achieving a far more 
meaningful balance than government officials.  But not all 
leaks are created equal; nor are all publishers of leaks.  In the 
hands of less careful, or less interested, publishers, 
unauthorized disclosures serve as an imperfect vehicle for 
disclosure of secret law. 
4. FOIA 
An established but oft-maligned tool of public 
accountability is the FOIA.  FOIA’s “basic purpose,” according 
to the Supreme Court, is no less than to “ensure an informed 
citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society, 
needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors 
accountable to the governed.”82  The Act’s primary purpose is 
disclosure not secrecy, and the law requires federal agencies 
to disclose records requested by any individual. 83   While 
exemptions from the Act’s disclosure requirements exist—for 
example, for protecting law enforcement techniques,84 and 
protecting “intelligence sources and methods” 85 —those 
 
 81. Margaret Sullivan, Lessons in Surveillance Drama Redux, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/public-editor/sullivan-lessons-in-a-
surveillance-drama-redux.html. 
 82. NLRB v. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. 214 (1978). 
 83. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 
(2001). 
 84. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). 
 85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
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exemptions are supposed to have a “narrow compass.”86 
In passing FOIA, Congress intended to open agency 
action to the scrutiny of the public.87  To this end, both the 
provisions of FOIA and cases interpreting the law have 
evinced a powerful aversion to agency attempts to hide 
agency “law” from public disclosure.  Indeed, “[o]ne of the 
principal purposes of the Freedom of Information Act is to 
eliminate secret law.”88  The affirmative portions of FOIA 
underscore the statute’s aversion to secret law: agency’s are 
affirmatively required to disclose “final opinions, including 
concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders, made 
in the adjudication of cases;”89 and “those statements of policy 
and interpretations” that have been adopted by the agency.90 
For all the high-minded talk of exposing agency action to 
the light of day, FOIA, in practice, is also not without its 
limitations.  Although FOIA broadly mandates disclosure and 
affirmatively requires disclosure of interpretations relied 
upon by the agency—federal agencies are often reluctant to 
observe the full requirements of the law.  Consequently, a 
FOIA request for information may languish for months or 
even years, and even the onset of litigation does not 
guarantee disclosure of records.  Additionally, courts have 
afforded near-absolute deference to agencies when those 
agencies assert that disclosure of information—even with 
redactions to protect sources and methods—would cause 
harm to national security or law enforcement surveillance 
techniques.91  As a result of this deference, courts routinely 
allow the government to withhold documents, in their 
entirety, simply because portions of the documents may 
contain sensitive material. 
Indeed, the government was able to conceal its 
interpretation of Section 215 for two years, despite the 
 
 86. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151 (1989). 
 87. NARA v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004). 
 88. Jordan v. Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon, 
J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 89. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A). 
 90. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B). 
 91. See e.g., Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1999).  Because 
“courts have little expertise in either international diplomacy or 
counterintelligence operations, [they] are in no position to dismiss the [agency’s] 
facially reasonable concerns” about the harm that disclosure could cause to 
national security. 
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existence of at least two separate FOIA lawsuits filed 
specifically to compel disclosure of that interpretation.92  Seen 
in this light, FOIA may seem like an ineffective tool; however, 
as will be shown, with only slight alteration to current FOIA 
litigation practices, the government’s ability to shield secret 
legal interpretations of surveillance law can be greatly 
diminished, without compromising legitimately protectable 
“sources and methods.” 
I. THE SOLUTION: THE TEARLINE VAUGHN INDEX 
Public debate on the government’s use of Section 215 was 
unduly constrained.  The public could have readily been 
informed of the salient characteristics of the government’s 
interpretation of the law—that the term “relevant” had been 
interpreted to authorize the production of millions of 
“irrelevant” records;93 that those irrelevant records included 
the records of millions of law abiding Americans;94 and that 
the FBI could obtain the orders, not for itself, but for other 
intelligence agencies—without disclosing the specifics of the 
Section 215 program.95  This problem could have been avoided 
through the compelled production of unclassified summaries 
of this legal interpretation—a tearline Vaughn. 
The tearline Vaughn is the combination of two types of 
documents: the “tearline” and the Vaughn index.  First, a 
“tearline” is a tool already in use within the intelligence 
community.  Essentially, tearlines are a way to disseminate 
information without revealing the classified information on 
which it is based.96  Tearlines are portions of a document 
“that provide the substance of a more highly classified or 
controlled report without identifying sensitive sources, 
methods, or other operational information.” 97   As one 
advocate for their greater use, Steven Aftergood of the 
 
 92. See supra note 37. Despite the existence of these lawsuits, the NSA’s 
bulk collection of call records under Section 215 remained secret until the 
Guardian’s story in 2013. 
 93. See 50 U.S.C.  § 1861. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Intelligence Community Directive 209, Tearline Production and 
Dissemination (Sept. 6, 2012), OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCE, available at https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-209.pdf. 
 97. Id. 
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Federation of American Scientists, has described them, 
tearlines refer “to the practice of segregating and withholding 
the most sensitive portions of a document, allowing the 
remainder to be ‘torn off,’ literally or figuratively, and widely 
disseminated.”98 
As recent practice has shown, it is often possible for the 
executive branch to disclose, in general terms, legal analysis 
concerning intelligence or law enforcement sources and 
methods without revealing the sensitive particulars of those 
methods.  For example, the DOJ has released unclassified 
“white papers” on its legal interpretation of Section 215 and 
on the executive branch’s authority to conduct targeted 
killings of citizens overseas.99  These white papers are similar 
to tearlines in many respects.  They deal, in general terms, 
with the substance of the legal analysis supporting the 
methods, without revealing the particular sources and 
methods at issue.  For example, the White Paper on Section 
215 does not disclose the particular telecommunication 
companies involved in the program; and, indeed, one could 
envision an even more abstracted version that dealt only with 
“business records” generally, not the particular telephone 
records at issue in the NSA’s program.100  Although Congress 
has indicated that the executive branch should employ 
tearlines with more frequency, it has not mandated their use 
in any particular circumstance. 101   However, without 
government creation of an unclassified summary for its own 
use, these types of publicly producible documents may not 
otherwise exist. 
The litigation procedures already in place in FOIA can 
help fill this gap.  The compelled production of documents, 
however, runs contrary to basic FOIA tenets.  As a general 
rule, agencies are not required to create documents in 
response to a FOIA request that do not otherwise exist—with 
 
 98. Steven Aftergood, DNI Directive Promotes Use of “Tearline” Documents, 
FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (Sept. 28, 2012), available at 
http://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2012/09/tearlines/. 
 99. Department of Justice White Paper, NBC NEWS MEDIA,  
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.p
df; Administration White Paper, Bulk Collection of Telephony (Aug. 9, 2013), 
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 100. See generally id. 
 101. See 6 U.S.C. § 485(d)(1). 
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one common exception: the Vaughn Index.  Named for the 
seminal DC Circuit decision, Vaughn v. Rosen, the Vaughn 
index requires government agencies to create an index of 
withheld documents, “specifying in detail which portions of 
the document are disclosable and which are allegedly 
exempt.”102   
As the D.C. Circuit recognized in Vaughn, the 
“traditional adversary nature of our legal system’s form of 
dispute resolution” is “seriously distort[ed]” in the typical 
FOIA case.103  This is so because, in ordinary civil litigation, 
“the facts relevant to a dispute are more or less equally 
available to adverse parties.”104  But, in FOIA cases, it is 
anomalous, but obviously inevitable, that the party with the 
greatest interest in obtaining disclosure is at a loss to argue 
with desirable legal precision for the revelation of the 
concealed information.  Obviously the party seeking 
disclosure cannot know the precise contents of the documents 
sought; secret information is, by definition, unknown to the 
party seeking disclosure.  In many, if not most, disputes 
under the FOIA, resolution centers around the factual nature, 
the statutory category, of the information sought.105 
The Vaughn index, then, is used to recalibrate that 
imbalance—however slightly.  The Vaughn index “describe[s] 
the document withheld or any redacted portion thereof, 
disclosing as much information as possible without thwarting 
the exemption’s purpose.” 106  And the Vaughn index falls 
outside of FOIA’s general prohibition against compelled 
creation of documents because the index is actually a 
procedural litigation tool—a product of the courts’ inherent 
authority to regulate the parties before it.  It is akin to a 
privilege log—a procedural tool common in typical civil 
discovery. 
The tearline Vaughn, then, is a combination of the 
attributes of the tearline and the Vaughn index. First, 
agencies are able to produce unclassified “summaries,” even 
of classified content and an already-established procedure 
 
 102. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 103. Id. at 824. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. King v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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exists for doing so—the tearline.  Second, in spite of FOIA’s 
general prohibition on the creation of documents, the federal 
courts are empowered to order the government to create 
documents in FOIA cases—and, indeed, often do—
particularly where fairness requires it.   
The tearline Vaughn can be implemented in those 
instances where a court is caught between accommodating 
the executive branch’s need to protect sensitive intelligence 
“sources and methods” and honoring Congress’ purpose, in 
passing FOIA, of eliminating agency “secret law.” If we accept 
that FOIA’s primary purpose is to root out secret law within 
government, 107  it follows that courts should not casually 
accept government attempts to shield entire documents 
containing controlling agency legal interpretations, even if 
those documents might contain some legitimately classifiable 
information.  Courts should be willing to push the executive 
branch to be as forthcoming as possible when the documents 
are believed to contain agency law.  A tearline Vaughn 
accomplishes precisely that.  
Indeed, such a compelled tearline may be the only 
method to ensure government compliance with another 
requirement of FOIA—the obligation to segregate and release 
non-exempt information. 108   While the government often 
contends that redaction of sensitive information would yield 
only incomprehensible fragments, such claims are less 
credible where the document consists primarily of legal 
analysis.  Cases, statutes, and legal principles—divorced from 
their specific factual bases—can be disclosed without 
compromising specific sources or methods. Indeed, the 
tearline Vaughn preempts this argument.  Faced with choice 
of a purportedly incomplete redacted version, or a tearline 
Vaughn—the government should welcome the opportunity to 
provide a more fulsome explanation in tearline format. 
The procedure for litigating the propriety and 
completeness of the tearline Vaughn would be similar to 
current FOIA litigation practices.  In current FOIA litigation, 
a FOIA plaintiff is able to challenge the adequacy or 
 
 107. Public Citizen, Inc. v. OMB, 598 F.3d 865, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010)(“FOIA 
provides no protection for such ‘secret law’ developed and implemented by an 
agency.”). 
 108. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). 
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sufficiency of the government’s Vaughn index.109  That is, the 
requester can contest that the government has not disclosed 
“as much information as possible” about the withheld 
documents.110  The court then reviews the Vaughn, at times, 
the withheld documents and decides if the government has 
satisfied its obligation.  An identical procedure could function 
with a tearline Vaughn.  After submitting the tearline, the 
parties could dispute whether the government had disclosed 
“as much information as possible” about the withheld legal 
analysis.111  A reviewing court (in accordance with FOIA’s 
current procedures)112 could examine the original, classified 
legal analysis in camera, comparing it to the tearline version 
submitted by the government, to settle whether its disclosure 
obligations had been satisfied. Such a procedure would ensure 
both that the public has the information it needs to critically 
assess the government’s legal interpretation while at the 
same time maintaining the secrecy of any legitimately 
sensitive sources and methods.113 
The tearline Vaughn is preferable to Congressional 
investigations, alone, because it marshals the authority of 
two branches of the federal government—Congress and the 
judiciary. 114   The tearline Vaughn avoids the problem of 
selective disclosure provided through discovery. A tearline 
Vaughn could be created about any surveillance technique 
the government is known to use or any provision of public 
law.  This process also better addresses the problem posed by 
the case of unauthorized leaks—leaving to the judgment of 
 
 109. See Davin v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1065 (3d Cir. 
1995) (remanding case for further 
proceedings and suggesting that another, more detailed Vaughn Index 
be required); Church of Scientology Int’l v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 
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 110. King, 830 F.2d at 224. 
 111. Id. 
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media and publishers what information should be disclosed.  
While judges may lack the subject-matter knowledge of many 
journalists, federal judges rightly claim the same apparent 
neutrality.  In addition, the federal judiciary is at least a 
formal part of our constitutional structure, lending its role as 
arbiter of disclosure an air of democratic legitimacy that 
newspaper publishers otherwise lack.  Applying the tearline 
Vaughn to the case of Section 215 demonstrates its potential. 
As described above, in the context of Section 215, the normal 
channels of public access failed.  The government was able to 
conceal from public disclosure for nearly eight years Section 
215’s unprecedentedly broad interpretation and 
implementation—in spite of Congressional oversight of its 
use, Section 215-derived evidence’s use in a criminal 
prosecution, and in spite of two separate FOIA lawsuits 
directed at the interpretation.  When the levee broke in June 
2013, the government’s most cherished secrets, including 
Verizon’s participation in the program, came pouring out. 
But the buildup in secrets behind the levee was 
unnecessary.  The government could readily have provided 
more information about the government’s interpretation 
without compromising the purported information it was 
trying to protect.  For example, the government could readily 
have provided more detailed information about its definition 
of “relevance.”115  The only insight the government previously 
revealed concerning Section 215’s interpretation was that it 
was “similar to a grand jury subpoena.” 116   But, as the 
government well knew, no grand jury subpoena in the history 
of the Republic was as broad as even a single Section 215 
order.  Such understatement served only to deflect criticism 
and scrutiny, to conceal the government’s interpretation, and 
to block the public from meaningfully debating the propriety 
of the statute. 
All the government needed to disclose was the fact that, 
 
 115. This, of course, presumes that the government actually had conducted 
such an interpretation prior to the disclosures.  Sadly, it is not always the case 
that a searching legal review of a particular technique is performed prior to its 
use. 
 116. Letter from Sen. Ron Wyden & Sen. Mark Udall, to Eric Holder, 
Attorney General of United States Department of Justice (Sept. 21, 2011), 
available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=a3670ed3-9f65-4740-
b72e-061c7de83f75&download=1. 
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under the government’s interpretation, a single Section 215 
order could be used to obtain records concerning millions of 
Americans, almost all of whom would have no connection 
whatsoever to terrorism.  They failed to, however, for 
pragmatic reasons: they likely knew that such a disclosure 
would lead to public outcry and the elimination of the 
program.  And, such evasiveness speaks to the democratic 
legitimacy of such a law or interpretation. 
That type of disclosure would have revealed very little 
operationally-sensitive information about the call records 
collection program: it would not have revealed that the 
government was collecting call records, let alone doing so in 
bulk; it would not have revealed the providers that were 
turning over call records; and it would not have revealed the 
targets of the investigation.117  It would only have revealed 
that the government had interpreted its authority under 
Section 215 to allow it to obtain records on millions of 
Americans—the very aspect of the program that sparked such 
broad public outrage. 
CONCLUSION 
At least with respect to the Section 215 program, many of 
these “unauthorized” disclosures could have been avoided 
with more enlightened disclosure policies by Congress, the 
Executive branch, or the courts.  A more tailored disclosure 
policy, such as that provided through a tearline Vaughn, 
would have protected the government’s sources, methods, and 
targets of investigations while still allowing the public to 
engage in a meaningful debate about its use.  Furthermore, 
the public could compel the government to disclose how it 
interpreted the law without disclosing how it implemented the 
law. 
The tearline Vaughn system cannot claim to be a perfect 
system.  But, while there may be some difficult cases around 
the edges, for the vast majority of techniques of intelligence 
programs, the legal principles animating the programs can be 
discussed at some level of abstraction without disclosing 
sources and methods.  And that is precisely the role the 
tearline Vaughn can provide. 
 
 117. Indeed, the targets remain classified today. 
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